Jack & Jill Take Lots of Pills, but Jill Comes Tumbling After: Gender Inequality in Privately Funded Early Phase Clinical Trials by Oppenheim, Shana F.
William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice
Volume 22 | Issue 2 Article 7
Jack & Jill Take Lots of Pills, but Jill Comes
Tumbling After: Gender Inequality in Privately
Funded Early Phase Clinical Trials
Shana F. Oppenheim
Copyright c 2016 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl
Repository Citation
Shana F. Oppenheim, Jack & Jill Take Lots of Pills, but Jill Comes Tumbling After: Gender Inequality in
Privately Funded Early Phase Clinical Trials, 22 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 393 (2016),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl/vol22/iss2/7
JACK & JILL TAKE LOTS OF PILLS,BUT JILL COMES
TUMBLING AFTER:GENDER INEQUALITY IN PRIVATELY
FUNDED EARLY PHASE CLINICAL TRIALS
INTRODUCTION
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF WOMEN IN CLINICAL TRIALS
A. Introduction to Drug Development
1. History of Women and Drug Development
2. The 1980s and the Tipping Point
B. The Current Medical Regulatory Climate
C. A Brief Review of Previously Suggested Solutions
II. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO GENDER DISPARITY IN
CLINICAL TRIALS
A. Gender Equality in Early Phase Clinical Trials for New
Molecular Entities
B. Supply Side Problem: Why Are Women Risk Adverse to
Joining New Molecular Entity Clinical Trials?
1. No Difference in Risk Appetite
2. Valuation Difference in Risk Appetite
3. Perceived Difference in Risk Appetite
III.LITIGATION SOLUTIONS
A. The Assumption of Risk Clause from Hell
B. Qui Tam Standing Statute
IV.ECONOMIC INCENTIVE SOLUTIONS
A. Patent Extension
B. Prescription Drug User Fee Act Filings
CONCLUSION
393
394 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol.22:393
INTRODUCTION
Imagine it is the 1950s.A well-respected European pharmaceu-
tical company develops the first safe sleeping pill well call it T-Pill.
T-Pill is seen as an extremely successful medicine for treating preg-
nant women with morning sickness.1It is licensed as a prescription-
free over-the-counter drug in most of Europe.2 Use of T-Pill is so
widespread that in some European countries it becomes almost as
popular as aspirin.3 But T-Pill is silently deadly.
On Christmas Day 1956, the first known victim of T-Pill is born
a little girl without ears.4She is the daughter of a T-Pill Pharmaceuti-
cal Company employee.5Over time,thousands of children around the
world are born with severe physical disabilities including flipper-like
arms and legs.6Some of these children are institutionalized;others
have their flippers amputated to accommodate prostheses for arms
and legs.7In one severe case,a mother and her doctor were charged
with killing a deformed infant,an act that they saw as merciful.8
This horror was real,and its name was thalidomide.9 Thanks
to the workof a young Food and Drug Administration (FDA)pharma-
cologist,thalidomide never reached the United States,and in 1962,it
was banned worldwide.10However,the way that thalidomide reached
the market underscores a real issue that still persists today.Thalid-
omide was never tested on pregnant animals.11 Thus,its effects on
pregnant women were unknown and thousands of families suffered.12
Although thalidomide led to stricter regulatory reforms for the United
States pharmaceutical industry,reform efforts to ensure that drugs
are tested on women and men at parity are still developing.13 Tha-
lidomide is one of the darkest episodes in pharmaceutical research
1.Michael Winerip,The Death and Afterlife of Thalidomide,N.Y.TIMES (Sept.23,
2013),http:/www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/booming/the-death-and-afterlife-of-thalidomide
.html?_r=0[http://perma.cc/SL86-V2TX].
2.Thalidomide,SCIENCEMUSEUM,http:/www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/broughttolife
/themes/controversies/thalidomide.aspx[http://perma.cc/56BU-K549].
3.Winerip,supra note 1.
4.Id.
5.Id.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Id.
9.Winerip,supra note 1.
10.Id.
11.Thalidomide,supra note 2.
12.Id.
13.See Winerip,supra note 1.
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history, and an example of how important it is to test drugs on both
men and women.14
Men and women are not equal.For every male with rheumatoid
arthritis there are two to three females.15For every girl with autism
spectrum disorder there are five boys.16 For every man with lupus
there are sixwomen.17 The sexes react differently to illness as well.
For example, men with dilated cardiomyopathy weakened and
enlarged heart muscle die at a much younger age than women with
the same disease.18 At the cellular level and in the face of disease,
men and women are not equal.19
For decades,the biomedical community has acted under the
assumption that the cellular difference between XX and XY chro-
mosomes only affects the reproductive tracts of the human body.20
Under this bias,all differences between the sexes,outside of the re-
productive tract, must stem from sex hormones.21 In short,scien-
tists conduct research as if females are simply a variation on [the
male] theme.22
This Note will discuss how we can ameliorate the underrepre-
sentation of women in privately owned pharmaceutical company-
funded early phase clinical trials.23Specifically,where is the margin
for pharmaceutical companies to increase their profits by including
more women in early phase clinical trials?How does the government
take advantage of that money left on the table to encourage the
desired results?24
14.Thalidomide,supra note 2.
15.David Page,Why Sex Really Matters: David Page at TEDxBeaconStreet,YOUTUBE
at 8:42(Jan.11,2013),https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nQcgD5DpVlQ [http://perma
.cc/M74M-D2L6].
16.Id. at 9:16.
17.Id. at 9:45.
18.Id. at 10:23.
19.Id. at 13:59.
20.See id. at 14:03.
21.Page,supra note 15,at 14:52.
22.Roni Caryn Rabin,Labs Are Told to Start Including aNeglected Variable: Females,
N.Y.TIMES (May 14,2014),http:/www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/health/nih-tells-researchers
-to-end-sex-bias-in-early-studies.html [http://perma.cc/9UP9-XR9C];see Page,supranote
15,at 16:23(finding that some researchers do not even know if they are studying XX or
XY cell lines,making it impossible to account for the fundamental differences between
male and female cells).
23.It is important to note that the issue of gender bias in medical research begins with
the selection of male cell lines and male animals for research.However this Note will
focus only on women in privately funded clinical trials.
24.This Note makes two assumptions.One,if there were a profit margin for private
pharmaceutical companies to make money off of including women in early phase clinical
trials, they would have done so. Two, historical bias against women in clinical trials,
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Assuming that the underrepresentation of women in privately
funded clinical trials is a supply side issue,and not an irrational
bias,this Note identifies two possible solutions.One,insulate pri-
vate pharmaceutical companies against the extreme liability they
fear from damaging a womans ability to reproduce. Two, incentivize
pharmaceutical companies to market and pay more women to par-
ticipate in early stage clinical trials.The goal of such solutions is
to have sexviewed as a mere biological variable for the purposes of
clinical trials.
I.A BRIEF HISTORY OF WOMEN IN CLINICAL TRIALS
A. Introduction to Drug Development
Today,the Food and Drug Administration oversees the process
by which new drugs are tested and approved for marketing in the
United States.25 New drugs are subject to laboratory tests before
they are tested for human safety,including appropriate dosage and
effectiveness.26Clinical trials are the studies conducted on humans,
they process through three phases.27 Phase I is small-scale testing
in a minimal number of healthy volunteers at low doses to establish
minimal safety.28 Phase II is medium-scale testing in targeted dis-
eased volunteers treated to establish a safe and possibly efficacious
dose.29 Phase III is large-scale testing in hundreds to thousands of
patients suffering from the targeted disease to prove that the drug
has the desired effect.30
1. History of Women and Drug Development
Historically,women have been excluded from early phase clin-
ical trials (Phases I and II).31The earliest attempts to regulate phar-
maceutical testing, manufacturing, and marketing ignored sex
while pertinent and real,is the retrospective answer to this problem,whereas this Note
seeks a prospective answer.
25.Cynthia Hathaway,A Patent Extension Proposal to End the Underrepresentation
of Women in Clinical Trials and Secure Meaningful Drug Guidance for Women,67FOOD
& DRUG L.J.143,145(2012).
26.Id.
27.Id.
28.Id.
29.Id.
30.Id.
31.Ellen Pinnow et al.,Increasing Participation of Women in Early Phase Clinical
Trials Approved by the FDA,19WOMENS HEALTH ISSUES 89,89(2009).
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entirely.32 Before 1938,drug laws did not require safety testing;
that changed with the implementation of the Food,Drug,and Cos-
metics Act, passed in response to [the] widely-publicized contami-
nation of . . . Elixir Sulfanilamide, which caused the deaths of over
100 people, mostly children . . . .33
In the 1960s,thalidomide,and its teratogenic34 effects on fe-
tuses,35 caused the U.S.Food and Drug Administration (FDA)to
examine its protocols governing the inclusion of females of child
bearing potential in clinical trials.36 Thalidomide was a drug pri-
marily prescribed as a sedative and later used to alleviate nausea
and morning sickness in pregnant women;however,it led to severe
fetal deformities,primarily phocomelia (malformation of the limbs).37
In 1977, the FDA issued the General Considerations for the
Clinical Evaluation of Drugs, which prohibited females of childbear-
ing potential from participating in Phase I and early Phase II clinical
trials.38 Only after early Phase II trials showed the effectiveness of
a drug in men and/or older women could fertile females be included.39
2. The 1980s and the Tipping Point
In the 1980s,mainstream medicine began to take greater notice
of womens health issues.40Several large and influential studies had
omitted women as subjects of medical research.41 [T]he first study
of the role of estrogen in preventing heart disease was conducted
32.Hathaway,supra note 25,at 145.
33.Id.
34.Teratogenic means congenital malformations in fetuses.
35.It is interesting to note that a female FDA inspector,Frances Kelsey,prevented
thalidomides approval within the U.S. over the objections of her supervisors and phar-
maceutical companies.Kelsey was concerned about the lack of data indicating whether
the drug could cross the placenta,which provides nourishment to the fetus. See Bara
Fintel et al.,The Thalidomide Tragedy: Lessons for Drug Safety and Regulation,HELIX
(July 28,2009),https://helix.northwestern.edu/article/thalidomide-tragedy-lessons-drug
-safety-and-regulation [http://perma.cc/5HMP-6W4Z];see also, e.g.,Billy Joel,We Didnt
Start the Fire,BILLYJOEL.COM(Sept.21,1989),http:/www.billyjoel.com/music/storm-front
-we-didnt-start-fire [http://perma.cc/6LRB-QAKS] (referencing the children of thalido-
mide in his song We Didnt Start the Fire,which demonstrated the cultural penetration
the negative effects of thalidomide had on a generation).
36.Pinnow et al.,supra note 31,at 89.
37.Fintel et al.,supra note 35.
38.Pinnow et al.,supra note 31,at 89.
39.Id.
40.Londa Schiebinger,Womens Health and Clinical Trials,112J.CLIN.INVEST.973,
973(2003),http://www.jci.org/articles/view/19993[http://perma.cc/KX9Q-WSA7].
41.Id.
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solely on men . . . .42 The Physicians Health Study of the effects of
aspirin on cardiovascular disease enrolled 22,071men and 0women.43
The Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial,a randomized study
from 1973to 1982evaluating the correlation between blood pressure,
smoking,cholesterol,and coronary heart disease enrolled 12,866men
and 0women.44 The National Institute on Agings Baltimore Longi-
tudinal Study of Aging,a long range study conducted from 1958to
1975,excluded women despite the fact that women accounted for
two-thirds of the population over age 65.45 However, not all womens
health issues were ignored.For example,the Framingham Heart
Study, started in 1948, enrolled slightly more women than men and
has long stood as the benchmark epidemiological study on cardio-
vascular health . . . .46
The tipping point began with the AIDS epidemic of the 1980s,
which brought to light the sidelining of women,specifically the
lack of womens access to experimental AIDS medicines.47 Despite
overwhelming evidence since the first year in which AIDS was
reported that the disease affected both genders ...research on
AIDS was initially limited to investigations with men.48 As late as
1987, health officials claimed that there were insufficient numbers
of infected women to devote scarce resources to studying the epidemic
in women ...[although]women compromised 50% of AIDS cases in
Africa and AIDS had become the eighth leading cause of death in
American women aged 1544.49 [W]omens access to experimental
medicines was [also] severely limited . . . .50The clinical trial of AZT
illustrates the access problem. When the FDA approved AZT in
1987...only four percent of the participants were female,[and]not
one of the 63federally-sponsored studies had analyzed its effects on
women.51 Unsurprisingly, women suffered disproportionately from
toxic side effects.52
42.Id.
43.Id.
44.Id.
45.Id.
46.Schiebinger,supra note 40,at 973.
47.Hathaway,supra note 25,at 147.
48.Id. (quoting Ruth Faden et al.,Women as Vessels and Vectors: Lessons from the
HIV Epidemic, in FEMINISM & BIOETHICS:BEYOND REPRODUCTION 252,254(Susan M.
Wolf ed.,1996)(discussing the health ramifications of excluding women from AIDS trials)).
49.Id. at 14849.
50.Id. at 148.
51.Id. (alteration in original).
52.Id.
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Until 1998 . . . the FDA . . . routinely conducted [clinical trials of
new drugs]predominately on men ...even though women consume
approximately 80% of pharmaceuticals in the U.S.53 In 1987,the
National Institutes of Health (NIH)updated its grant guidelines to
encourage scientists seeking funding to include women and mi-
norities in their clinical research.54However,a 1992survey by the
U.S.General Accounting Office found that fewer than half of pre-
scription drugs on the market had been analyzed for sex-related
response differences.55
1993 saw the inauguration of the first large-scale study of
womens health. The Womens Health Initiative56 was a fifteen-year,
$625million study ...involv[ing]more than 160,000female sub-
jects.57 That same year, President Clinton signed an NIH appropri-
ations bill that codified as statute several policies supporting women
as both subjects and investigators.58 Finally, the FDA issued proposed
new regulations that revise[d]its guidelines for the drug development
process in favor of the inclusion of women.59
B. The Current Medical Regulatory Climate
As helpful as the regulatory improvements since the 1960s have
been to expanding the inclusion of women in clinical trials,they still
fall short of gender equality. Women now make up more than half
[of] the participants in publicly funded clinical research, but are
often still underrepresented in clinical trials carried out by [pri-
vate] drug companies and medical device manufacturers.60 As a
53.Schiebinger,supra note 40,at 973.
54.Cari Romm,Where Are All the Female Test Subjects?,THE ATLANTIC (Sept.4,
2014),http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/09/where-are-all-the-female-test
-subjects/379641[http://perma.cc/TWX8-4JDL].
55.Schiebinger,supra note 40, at 97374.
56.The National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Subtitle B Clinical
Research Equity Regarding Women and Minorities, established various womens health
protections.Section 492B(a)(1)(A)required inclusion of women,section 486(a)estab-
lished an Office of Research on Womens Health,section 486A established the National
Data System and Clearinghouse on Research on Womens Health, and section 486(b)(9)
required a biennial report.National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993,Sub-
title B (1993)(codified as amended at part G of title IV of the Public Health Service Act,
42U.S.C.§201et seq.),http:/orwh.od.nih.gov/about/pdf/NIH-Revitalization-Act-1993.pdf
[http://perma.cc/E69G-D9X3].
57.Vanessa Merton,The Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and Once-Pregnable People
(a.k.a. Women) from Biomedical Research,3TEX.J.WOMEN & L.307,312(1994).
58.Id.
59.Id. at 31213 (internal citation omitted).
60.Rabin,supra note 22.
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result of the over-reliance on male animals and male cell lines ...
[w]e literally know less about every aspect of female biology com-
pared to male biology.61
Studies utilizing government funding tend to include a higher
number of female participants 41%, compared with 37% for studies
not receiving government funding.62 However,this data does not
take into account the rate at which women participate in the different
phases of clinical trials.A review of New Molecular Entities approved
by the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research between 2000and
2002 found that [w]omen represented only 24% of all participants
in [Phase I and Phase II of clinical trials],compared with 64% [of]
men . . . .63 Equally problematic, 12% of trials did not specify the
sex of participants.64 A Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report from 2011concluded that women were underrepresented in
Phase I trials, as they accounted for only 22% of participants in the
initial safety trials used to set dosing levels.65
The FDA has also recently taken steps to increase transparency
surrounding women and minorities in clinical trials.Among these
steps is the development of the pilot program entitled Drug Trials
Snapshots,which provides information to the public about who par-
ticipated in clinical trials for new FDA approved drugs.66 Sixnew
drugs currently comprise the snapshot.67All were approved between
May 8,2014,and June 20,2014.68 They treat a variety of afflictions
including serious bacterial infections, including Crohns Disease,
Ulcerative Colitis,fungal infections,and peripheral arterial disease
related to heart attacks.69 The Snapshot breakdowns include the
drugs use, benefits, a demographic portrait of the clinical trials, and
differences between sex,race,and age broken out by efficacy.70
61.Roni Caryn Rabin,Health Researchers Will Get $10.1 Million to Counter Gender
Bias in Studies,N.Y.TIMES (Sept.23,2014),http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/23/health
/23gender.html [http://perma.cc/52FV-J43C].
62.Nicola Jones,Too Few Women in Clinical Trials? Cancer-Drug Studies Fail to
Reflect True Incidence of Disease in the Population,NATURE NEWS (June 8,2009),http://
www.nature.com/news/2009/090608/full/news.2009.549.html [http://perma.cc/8HHD
-2NVF].
63.Pinnow et al.,supra note 31,at 90.
64.Id. (internal citation omitted).
65.Id. (internal citation omitted).
66.See Drug Trials Snapshot,FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.(Nov.21,2014),http://www.fda
.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm412998.htm [http://perma.cc/UZE9-NEJB].
67.Id.
68.Id.
69.Id.
70.Id.
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71
71.Drug Trials Snapshot,supra note 66.
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The Snapshot data seems to indicate that there is variability of
sexparity among clinical trials for new molecular entities even among
private pharmaceutical companies.It is also important to note that
this data does not differentiate between early phase clinical trails and
later stage clinical trials.72
The recent media attention surrounding this issue has sparked
responses from the regulatory agencies and Congress.On Septem-
ber 23, 2014, the National Institutes of Health announced that it
will distribute $10.1 million in grants to more than 80 scientists
studying a variety of subjects.73 The funds will be used to include
more women in clinical trials,as well as to ensure that laboratory
animals and cell lines represent both genders.74
Additionally,Representative Jim Cooper (D-Tenn.)and Rep-
resentative Cynthia Lummis (R-Wyo.) are co-sponsoring a bill
the Research for All Act of 2015 to end gender bias in clinical
trials.75The bill would apply to federally-funded research and would
require that cells or tissues . . . are derived from both male and fe-
male organisms ...[or]both male and female animals are included
as subjects ...[and]results are disaggregated according to whether
the subjects are male or female so that safer [and] more effective
treatment for males or females can be provided.76However,both of
these solutions fail to change the behavior of the pharmaceutical in-
dustrial complexand they fail to provide a targeted solution to the
deficit of women in early-stage clinical trials.
C. A Brief Review of Previously Suggested Solutions
An overview of the literature delineates two avenues ofproposed
solutions to this issue:agency action or judicial action.However,
the focus remains on impacting publicly funded research instead of
privately funded research.Previously suggested agency based so-
lutions include:
(1) Altering the 2011 NIH guidelines encouraging women
as subjects in NIH-funded research to mandate that
all clinical trials include women.77
72.See id.
73.Rabin,supra note 61.
74.Id.
75.H.R.2101,114th Cong.(2015).
76.Id. §§3,4(b)(2).
77.Vicki Lawrence MacDougall,Medical Gender Bias and Managed Care,27OKLA.
CITY U.L.REV.781,819(2002).
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(2) Eliminating or narrowly defining the clear and com-
pelling rationale and justification exception to the
NIH Guidelines.78
(3) Altering the FDA and NIH standards to resemble those
of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS),which provide greater leeway for clinical trials
on fertile or pregnant women.79
(4) Increasing the NIHs budget for womens diseases.80
This seems to be the solution contemplated by NIHs
recent $10.1million grant to include more women and
female animals and cell lines in research.81
(5) Enforcing the 1998FDA amended regulation requiring
sponsors to breakdown drug safety and efficacy data
by gender,age,and race.82
(6) Enforcing the FDAs guidelines recommending clin-
ical trials include women in numbers sufficient to de-
tect clinically statistical gender differences in drug
responses.83
(7) Incentivizing pharmaceutical companies to include
women in their clinical trials through a patent exten-
sion,similar to that of the pediatric medical patent
extension structure.84
Previously suggested judicial solutions run the gambit from personal
injury actions to enforcing the principle of self-autonomy.85 One op-
tion is to pursue suits under 42U.S.C.section 1985(3),which allows
injured parties to recover damages for any conspiracy founded on
discriminatory purposes based on the plaintiffs membership in a
class,which deprives that person of equal protection under the law.86
One could argue that there is no similar NIH policy to exclude men
from clinical trials if the research could injure their reproductive
capabilities, even though a mans reproductive functioning may also
78.Id. at 819(emphasis omitted).
79.Id. at 82829.
80.L.Elizabeth Bowles,The Disfranchisement of Fertile Women in Clinical Trials:
The Legal Ramifications of and Solutions for Rectifying the Knowledge Gap,45VAND.
L.REV.877,920(1992).
81.See Rabin,supra note 61and accompanying text.
82.See Investigational New Drug Applications and New Drug Applications,63Fed.
Reg.6854(Aug.10,1998)(to be codified at 21C.F.R.314.50(d)(5)).
83.Bowles,supra note 80, at 89193.
84.Hathaway,supra note 25,at 144.
85.See MacDougall,supra note 77,at 792,823.
86.Id. at 789.
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be injured in a clinical trial.87 However,although a woman may be
a member of a class for the purpose of a Section 1985action,there
must still be a conspiracy or discriminatory intent,which would be
difficult to demonstrate.88
Another option is to challenge the gender bias practices based
on a personal injury action.89However,medical negligence is the stan-
dard,which is based on the violation of a standard of care customary
to the practice of other physicians in the same area of medicine,
making it unlikely to succeed since the practice of gender bias in med-
ical research is endemic.90 Yet another potential avenue for litiga-
tion would arise under the doctrine of informed consent where there
is a violation of a doctors duty to disclose any material risk of treat-
ments or alternatives.91However,this argument requires construing
the gender gap in clinical trials and as such the effects it may have
on the accuracy of dosage, side effect, and even effectiveness as a
material riskof treatment that must be disclosed.92
An option to attackpharmaceutical companies directly would be
founded on a negligence standard or a theory of strict products liability
in tort.93 The negligence argument would establish that reasonable
care requires a gendered analysis of any clinical trial data to ascer-
tain any side effect[s] or dosage requirements unique to women.94
The strict liability argument is based on the pharmaceutical compa-
nies failure to provide adequate warning and injecting a defectively
designed product into the stream of commerce.95Finally,a litigant
could argue that the exclusion of women from clinical trials,because
they may become pregnant, violates the Supreme Courts established
principle of self-autonomy.96
II.FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO GENDER DISPARITY IN
CLINICAL TRIALS
The above-explored solutions rely on either targeting publicly
funded clinical trials or a theory of punishment to incentivize a
change in private-sector pharmaceutical company behavior.Given
87.Id. at 821.
88.Id. at 78990.
89.Id. at 793.
90.Id. at 792.
91.MacDougall,supra note 77,at 796.
92.See id. at 79697.
93.Id. at 82122.
94.Id. at 822.
95.Id. at 82223.
96.Id. at 823.
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the recent public outcry over the gender gap in clinical trials and the
NIH funding increase earmarked for this cause,97 publicly funded
clinical trials are already on their way to a solution.
Instead,it is time to concentrate on changing the behavior of
Big Pharma, a nickname for influential pharmaceutical companies
represented by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA).98 This targeted approach also stands to produce
a larger effect on the overall market because private pharmaceutical
company Research and Development (R&D)spending far outstrips
NIH funding.In 2009the total NIH budget was $30.6billion.99That
same year,the R&D expenditures of only PhRMA member compa-
nies was $45.8billion,which was an abrupt downturn from highs of
$47.9and $47.4billion in the previous two years.100Further,the phar-
maceutical industrial complex is a multibillion dollar industry,101
with strong lobbying power,102 and the ability to overturn or impact
any restricting rules or statutes,and the war chest to fight any court
imposed penalties.103 For these reasons,it may take a combined
carrot and stick strategy to impact the behavior of private phar-
maceutical funded clinical trials.
A. Gender Equality in Early Phase Clinical Trials for New
Molecular Entities
Although this could be framed as a pure equality-of-the-sexes
issue, the truth is there is actual harm being done to womens health
from their underrepresentation in clinical trials.The consequence
97.See Rabin,supra note 61.
98.Big Pharma is [a] nickname given to the worlds vast and influential pharmaceu-
tical industry and its trade and lobbying group,the Pharmaceutical Research and Manu-
facturers of America . . . . Six of the largest drug companies in the world have their
headquarters in the United States:Johnson & Johnson,Pfizer,Abbot Laboratories,Merck,
Bristol-Myers Squibb,and Eli Lilly.The ten largest drug companies in the world made
a net profit of $429.4billion in 2014.See Big Pharma,DRUGWATCH,http:/www.drugwatch
.com/manufacturer [http://perma.cc/6ZVK-UYYU].
99.Private and Public R&D Spending,PHRMA,http://www.phrma.org/private-public
-rd-spending [http://perma.cc/9DBH-69X3].
100.Id.
101.Top 25 Pharma Companies by Global Sales,PMLIVE,http://www.pmlive.com/top
_pharma_list/global_revenues [http://perma.cc/K78U-NDEF].
102.See Annual Lobbying on Pharm/Health Products,OPENSECRETS.ORG (2015),
http:/www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=H04[http://perma.cc/L4VY-CVGL].
103.See, e.g.,Jef Feeley,Merck Pays $23 Million to End Vioxx Drug-Purchase Suits,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 19,2013),http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-18
/merck-pays-23-million-to-end-vioxx-drug-purchase-suits [http://perma.cc/F4NN-9UQ3];
Peter Loftus & Brent Kendall,Merck to Pay $950 Million in Vioxx Settlement,WALL ST.
J.(Nov.23,2011),http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204531404577054472
253737682[http://perma.cc/Z7MF-BWZ2].
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of early stage underrepresentation is male-only clinical data.104This
can lead to a variety of complications with treatments,medicine,and
medical devices later down the line.105
As a baseline issue,women are particularly at risk of being
prescribed dosages devised for the average male weight and metabo-
lism.106 For example,acetaminophen (Tylenol)is eliminated by the
female body at about 60% the rate of elimination by men.107 Women
are also at approximately two times greater riskfor an adverse drug
reaction than men,108 and experience more severe side effects from
new treatments . . . .109 In 2013,the FDA told women to cut their
doses for the sleeping pill Ambien in half,because new studies
showed that women metabolize the active ingredient more slowly
than men do.110
Equally problematic are the studies that do not report results for
men and women separately.111 Research lags for treatment of heart
disease, the number one killer of women . . . because women make
up only one-third of the participants in [the]clinical trials ...and
most of [the] studies dont report results for [the sexes] separately.112
Women are also less likely to enroll in studies;for example women
who do not smoke are three times more likely than non-smoking
men to get lung cancer,but women are less likely to enroll in lung-
cancer studies.113
The problem also extends to biomedical devices.For instance,
the FDA approved an implantable defibrillator for both sexes even
104.Even before the clinical trial stage,the cell lines experimented on are gendered.
Each cell line has its own sex, and that genetic difference results in different biochemical
processes within those cells. For example, neurons cultured from males are more sus-
ceptible to death from starvation than those from females,because of differences in the
way cells process nutrients.Rabin,supra note 22.
105.See Bowles,supra note 80,at 886.
106.Schiebinger,supra note 40,at 974.
107.Id.
108.Id. (For example, some antithrombotic agents used to break up blood clots imme-
diately after a heart attack,while beneficial to many men,may cause significant bleed-
ing problems in women.Commonly prescribed drugs used to treat high blood pressure
tend to lower mens mortality from heart attackbut have been shown to increase cardiac-
related deaths among women.Emerging evidence also suggests that the effects of anti-
depressants can vary over the course of the menstrual cycle.Subsequently,drug dosage
may be too high at some points during estrous and too low at others.) (citations omitted).
109.Rabin,supra note 22.
110.Id.
111.Deborah Kotz,Medical Research Still Lags on Women, Study Says,BOSTONGLOBE
(Mar.3,2014),https:/www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2014/03/03/research
-lacking-gender-differences-disease-study-finds/HV1QWeYEm8J1Lu6KTrIW1H/story.html
[http://perma.cc/J2RD-QG7S].
112.Id.
113.See id.
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though women only accounted for 15% of the participants in the 2002
effectiveness study.114A subsequent 2009study found that there was
no benefit for women.115Cancer studies are another area of concern,
with 75% of cancer studies underrepresenting women.116 For exam-
ple,45% of lung cancer diagnoses are in women,but on average only
31% of lung cancer study participants are women.117Overall,women
are materially affected in their health by the absence of gender parity
in clinical trials for new treatments.
B. Supply Side Problem: Why Are Women Risk Adverse to Joining
New Molecular Entity Clinical Trials?
The typical argument against the inclusion of women in clinical
trials,is that it is difficult to recruit women for such trials.118Reasons
given for this difficulty are often sociological.Women are frequently
the principal caregivers for children,the disabled,family,and friends,
and have less mobility and time to take off to attend to their own
medical needs.119Women are more likely to have to account to a male
partner for their time, and their disadvantaged economic position
means they have less to spend on transportation to and from a clin-
ical trial.120 In the substance abuse program context, womens par-
ticipation increased dramatically in response to childcare facilities
being provided as part of the program.121In the AIDS context,studies
did not reimburse for travel time or childcare,and pregnant women
were required to get permission from the fetuss father before enroll-
ing in the clinical trial.122Another issue may be that men and women
react differently to the risk-benefit analysis posited by participating
in a clinical trial.123
If the supply-side issue is caused by the structural nature of the
vast majority of female roles played in society,than one solution is
to subsidize pharmaceutical company recruiting costs so that burden
114.Id.
115.Id.
116.Jones,supra note 62.
117.Id.
118.See Merton,supra note 57,at 315;Symposium,Womens Health Law Symposium,
16WOMENS RTS.L.REP.17,18(1994).
119.Merton,supra note 57,at 315;see Jones,supra note 62.
120.Merton,supra note 57,at 315.
121.Id. at 315.
122.LESLIE LAURENCE & BETH WEINHOUSE,OUTRAGEOUS PRACTICES:THE ALARMING
TRUTH ABOUT HOW MEDICINE MISTREATS WOMEN 61,150(1994).
123.Jones,supra note 62.
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is taken from their bottom line.As I will discuss later,this incentiv-
izing bribe may take a few different forms. If the supply-side issue
is caused by a gendered presentation to risk-benefit analysis,then
to impact feminine behavior,we must examine the cause of the risk
differential.There are three options for risk presentation:(1)the
sexes have no difference in riskappetite,(2)the sexes value riskdif-
ferently,or (3)the sexes perceive riskdifferently.
1. No Difference in Risk Appetite
If the physical riskof participating in an early stage clinical trial
for a new molecular entity e.g., a complete unknown is actually
greater124 for women than men,then there is no actual difference in
riskappetite.Thus,it is rational for women to have lower rates of
participation in clinical trials,and there is no way to move their
position,short of mandating participation or paying women to take
more risk.125
The only reason to mandate participation is if we,as a society,
thinkthat the cost of having fewer women in clinical trials outweighs
the price of mandating individual women to take that risk.A man-
date could take the form of instituting a randomized draft to force
the politically agreed upon percentage of women to participate in
early stage clinical trials regardless of the risk,similar to what we
previously did with the military.However,the political will to achieve
such a mandate is unlikely.126Additionally,a mandate would face a
Free Rider Problem; that is, it is collectively in womens best inter-
est to have pharmaceutical products that are appropriate for feminine
treatment,but it is in no individual womans best interest to take
the risk.To put it colloquially,no one will want to bite the bullet.
2. Valuation Difference in Risk Appetite
Under this hypothesis,the physical riskis the same to women
and men participating in early stage clinical trials,but women value
their reproductive ability more than men.There is some evidence
that women do value their reproductive ability more than men as a
biological strategy for mating, [b]ecause women and not men bear
the time-and energy-intensive burden of gestation,parturition,and
124.The riskwould actually be greater if all other variables being equal,a woman or her
reproductive capability will be injured more times than a man in the same clinical trial.
125.Paying individual women to take higher risks would most likely run afoul of col-
lective bargaining regulations.
126.See Merton,supra note 57, at 38081.
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lactation,more of their value as potential spouses is tied up in their
reproductive capacity.127
3. Perceived Difference in Risk Appetite
Under this hypothesis,the riskis the same in women and men,
but women perceive a higher riskof participating in clinical trials,
possibly because it is more salient to them as the sexthat carries
children.Numerous studies have found a perceived riskdifferential
between men and women specifically in the health and environmen-
tal fields.128 [W]omen are found to perceive themselves . . . as being
more susceptible [to meningococcal diseases],and therefore perceive
a higher risk associated with the stated diseases.129 However,risk
perception cannot be reduced to a simple gender binary.Gender,
race,income,education level,and marital status all play a role in
riskperception.130
In a 1998study by Jianakopolos and Bernasek,females were
found to be more risk adverse than males,while single black fe-
males were found to hold riskier assets than single white women.131
A 2001 study by Bernasek and Shwiff found that among married
women,if a male spouse becomes more risk loving, then the female
partner becomes more risk averse.132 A 1996 study by Davidson
and Freudenburg found that women show higher concern for risks
associated with health and safety of the family and site-specific envi-
ronmental issues.Women were found to be less trusting of institu-
tions and technology that surround the origins of potential risk.133
Further complicating the picture,studies tend to show that white
men also perceive less risk.A 1999study by Slovic suggests that:
perhaps white males see less riskin the world because they cre-
ate,manage,control,and benefit from so much of it.Perhaps
women and nonwhite males see the world as more dangerous be-
cause in many ways they are more vulnerable,because they
127.SATISFACTION IN CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 11(Robert J.Sternberg & Mahzad Hojjat
eds.,1997).
128.See Chian Jones Ritten,Measuring Values for Environmental Public Goods:
Incorporating Gender and Ethnic Social Effects Into Stated-Preference Value-Elicitation
Methods (2011)(unpublished Ph.D.dissertation,Colo.State University),http://dspace
.library.colostate.edu/browse?type=author&value=Jones+Ritten%2C+Chian [http://perma
.cc/6YYW-HL4G].
129.Id. at 129.
130.Id. at 38.
131.Id. at 28.
132.Id.
133.Id. at 33.
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benefit less from many of its technologies and institutions,and
because they have less power and control ....134
Importantly, a 1997 study by Bord and OConner showed that women
who perceive more risk are also willing to take voluntary actions to
protect themselves against sources of perceived risks.135
In its Survey of U.S.Adults on Clinical Trials Research Partici-
pation, the Society for Womens Health Research found that women
were more likely to be hesitant to participate because of concerns over
the type of study,the risk,and their valuation of their own health.136
For example,21.7% of women,as compared to 15.4% of men,would
hesitate to participate depending on the type of study.137 Whereas,
17.5% of women,as compared to 15.2% of men,would be hesitant to
participate because of risky or dangerous side effects,which suggests
a higher perception of risk.138 More women 9.7% as compared to
5.1% of men thought that they were not healthy enough to partici-
pate in a clinical trial.139 Additionally, more women 7.2% as com-
pared to 2.4% of men thought they were too old to participate.140
Interestingly,more men than women said they did not have the time
to participate 26.7% compared to 17.4%141 but this could merely
reflect men putting a higher premium on their time.
In sum,it is important to keep in mind that women are behaving
rationally in response to a risk-benefit analysis when crafting so-
lutions to this issue.
III.LITIGATION SOLUTIONS
Two potential litigation-based solutions to change the behavior
of pharmaceutical companies are (1)pre-empt state tort law with
regard to teratogenic risks and (2)enact a statute giving non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs)standing to sue pharmaceutical
companies on behalf of women for not complying with statutory
requirements.
134.Ritten,supra note 128,at 36.
135.Id. at 38.
136.SOCY FOR WOMENS HEALTH RESEARCH,Survey of U.S. Adults on Clinical Trials
Research Participation 2(2008),http://swhr-web.s3.amazonaws.com/migrated/Womens
HealthWeekSurveyResults.pdf%3FdocID=2041_53bbdd60976d57.14058554.pdf%3FdocID
=2041[http://perma.cc/ZDV9-XTB9].
137.Id.
138.Id.
139.Id.
140.Id.
141.Id.
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A. The Assumption of Risk Clause from Hell
To achieve parity of women in early phase clinical trials,phar-
maceutical companies must be incentivized to take on the perceived
riskof including more women,who may be likely to sue over bad out-
comes,specifically teratogenic risks.142However,any incentive struc-
ture that walls women off from ex post damages may discourage
them from signing up for clinical trials in the first place.
A strategy pre-empting state law regarding teratogenic risks
could be constructed similar to the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986.143 The Act was designed to shield pharmaceutical com-
panies from vaccine liability,specifically from lawsuits by parents
claiming that vaccines harmed their children.144The Act addressed a
shortage of vaccines,triggered bycostly tort actions against the manu-
facturers, by setting up a no-fault, nontort compensation alternative
for individuals injured by compulsory childhood immunization.145
In Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC,the Supreme Court upheld the Act
in a 6to 2ruling.146The majority held that Congress found the system
necessary to ensure that vaccines remained readily available and to
put federal regulators in the best position to decide whether vaccines
are safe and properly designed.147Justice Scalia opined that the Act
reflects a sensible choice to leave complex epidemiological judgments
about vaccine design to the FDA and the National Vaccine Program
rather than juries.148 The Act also sets up a special tribunal The
Vaccine Court to allow parents compensation for negative side
effects that,in the rare instance,accompany vaccination.149
A similar legislative action could protect pharmaceutical compa-
nies from tort suits initiated by women participating in clinical
trials in response to teratogenic injuries to fetuses affected by those
early stage clinical trials.This would reduce the perceived cost to
pharmaceutical companies and expand their profit margin on clini-
cal trials where they have included women at parity with men.The
statute could be structured such that the tort protection is not
triggered unless there is gender equality at all stages of the clinical
142.MacDougall,supra note 77,at 786.
143.42U.S.C.§§300aa-10to -33(West 1987).But see 42U.S.C.§300aa-18(repealed
1987).
144.See Mary Beth Neraas,Comment,The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986: A Solution to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?,63WASH.L.REV.149,149(1988).
145.Id. at 14950.
146.Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 107172 (2011).
147.See id. at 1073.
148.Id. at 1080.
149.See id. at 1073,1100.
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trials and the data for both sexes is reported to the FDA during their
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA)filing.150
However,the inability to receive post hoc compensation for
participating in a clinical trial,which results in fetal injuries,could
discourage women from participating in such studies.Depending on
the profit margin created by removing this liability hanging over
pharmaceutical companies,individual companies may be able to
counter the disincentive created in the pool of women willing to sign
up for clinical trials simply by paying them more.151However,given
the evidence that women perceive greater risk and are thus more
risk-averse to early stage clinical trials and other factors impacting
their health,the amount of money the pharmaceutical companies
may have to pay in marketing and in direct participation subsidies
to women may be more expensive than the losses the litigation
shield prevents.
B. Qui Tam Standing Statute
Enacting a qui tam statute is a second option to incentivize
pharmaceutical companies to craft gender parity into their early
phase clinical trials.This option,unlike the assumption of riskclause,
would provide less of a deterrence to already risk-averse women
because it preserves the possibility of expost damages recovery for
adverse effects.
Under a qui tam statute,Congress could pass a federal statute
that gives standing to NGOs in order to sue private pharmaceutical
companies in the name of the United States on behalf of women ex-
cluded from clinical trials.152 Qui tam represents the Latin phrase
qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipse in hoc parte sequitur,which
means he [w]ho sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself.153
The False Claims Act qui tam provision154 provides a model for
this proposed gender parity in clinical trials qui tam act.The False
Claims Act is the governments principal antifraud tool.155A gender
parity qui tam statute could provide the same monitoring function
for pharmaceutical company clinical trials and could even extend to
genetic line and animal testing.
150.See infra notes 18389.
151.See SOCY FOR WOMENS HEALTH RESEARCH,supra note 136,at 2.
152.See, e.g.,Evan Caminker,Comment,The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions,
99YALE L.J.341,341(1989).
153.BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1251(6th ed.1990).
154.31 U.S.C. §§ 37293733 (2015).
155.David Farber,Note,Agency Costs and the False Claims Act,83FORDHAM L.REV.
219,223(2014).
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A qui tam statute could be constructed to impose civil liability
on pharmaceutical companies that do not meet a certain parity of gen-
der in their clinical trials from Phase I through III and/or do not in-
clude that gendered data in their PDUFA filings.The statute could
be constructed narrowly to give standing to only certain organiza-
tions,such as not-for-profit,non-governmental entities involved in
health care policy.The qui tam frameworkhas the advantage of en-
listing the knowledge and resources of the citizens to supplement pub-
lic law enforcement efforts.156 However,considering the strength of
the pharmaceutical lobby,a statute imposing such broad liability is
unlikely to pass.157
An additional problem with enacting a gender parity qui tam
statute is that qui tam statutes in general are vulnerable to nuisance
settlements.158 A litigant can employ a nuisance-value strategy by
asserting a meritless claim . . . in order to extract a payoff based on
the cost the other party would incur . . . .159Pharmaceutical compa-
nies,with their large revenues,would present an attractive target
for nuisance suits.
IV.ECONOMIC INCENTIVE SOLUTIONS
Beyond litigation based solutions,economic incentives provide
a model for encouraging private pharmaceutical companies to con-
duct clinical trials to a certain standard of gender parity as set by the
FDA.In order to economically affect private pharmaceutical company
behavior, there must be money left on the table that the government
can offer to increase the profit margin and thus affect change.160
Possible solutions include:(1)establishing a patent extension on the
life of new molecular entities which fit the established criteria;and
(2)changing the structure of transactional costs for PDUFA filings
with the FDA.
156.Caminker,supra note 152,at 341.
157.In 2014,the pharmaceutical lobby spent $229,124,563on lobbying.This is down
from an industry high,since tracking began in 1998,of $273,009,917in 2009.The phar-
maceutical lobbying industry is large in scale as well,with 357clients and 1,425lobbyists
as of 2014.Of those lobbyists,880(61.1%)are considered revolvers individuals whose
professional experience includes positions in both the public and private sector,who thus
can leverage the power and access afforded them due to those ties for the pharmaceutical
lobbys interests. See Industry Profile: Summary, 2009,OPENSECRETS.ORG,https://www
.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=H0R&year=2009[http://perma.cc/9BMN-LR9E];
Industry Profile: Summary, 2014, OPENSECRETS.ORG,https:/www.opensecrets.org/lobby
/indusclient.php?id=H04&year=2014#[http://perma.cc/5YDY-9954].
158.Randy J.Kozel & DavidRosenberg,Solving the Nuisance-Value SettlementProblem:
Mandatory Summary Judgment,90VA.L.REV.1849,1850(2004).
159.Id. at 1850.
160.See Hathaway,supra note 25,at 144.
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A. Patent Extension
Under Article I,Section 8,clause 8 of the U.S.Constitution,
Congress shall have power [t]o promote the Progress of . . . [the] use-
ful Arts,by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries [sic].161A patent is issued by
the federal government to the first inventor,giving him/her the right
to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling
the invention throughout the United States or importing the inven-
tion into the United States.162The patent grant is limited to twenty
years from filing an application for a patent.163However,this twenty-
year grant is abrogated by the fact that the drug cannot be marketed
for profit until approved by the FDA.164Undergoing the process of pre-
clinical testing,investigational new drug applications,Phase I stud-
ies,clinical and Phase II and III trials,takes years,and requesting
approval to market the drug typically itself takes fifteen months.165
This arduous process shortens the time a manufacturer can take
advantage of exclusive marketing in order to recoup its investment.
Two Acts,the 1984Hatch-Waxman Act,166and the 1997Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act,167 provide a model for ex-
tending patent exclusivity in exchange for drugmanufacturers includ-
ing women at parity in cell line testing,animal testing,and all three
phases of clinical trails.The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984,otherwise known as the Hatch-Waxman Act,
amended drug and patent laws to create patent term restoration.168
Hatch-Waxman provides a patent holder with the entitlement to have
a period of time added backto the patent term equal to one-half of the
period between the Investigation New Drug Application (IND)169
161.U.S.CONST.art.I,§8,cl.8.
162.35U.S.C.§154(a)(1)(2006).
163.Id.
164.See JOHN R.THOMAS,PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 17(2005).
165.Hathaway,supra note 25,at 168.
166.Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,Pub.L.No.98-417,98
Stat.1585 (1984)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 35 U.S.C.);see
Hathaway,supra note 25,at 168.
167.Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997,Pub.L.No.105-115,
111Stat.2296(1997).
168.Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,Pub.L.No.98-
417,98Stat.1585(1984)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21and 35U.S.C.).
169.An IND is an Investigation New Drug Application,which is filed with the FDA
to conduct human testing.The IND also submits preclinical data about the new compound,
its formulation,and effect in animals.The IND also contains information about plans to
test the safety of the compound in Phase I studies.See Gerald J.Mossinghoff,Overview
of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process,54FOOD &
DRUG L.J.187,192(1999).
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and a New Drug Application (NDA)170 submission,plus the entire
NDA review period.171However,the total period restored cannot ex-
ceed five years and the total term of the restored patent cannot exceed
fourteen years.172Hatch-Waxman amendments also provide market-
ing exclusivity periods for new chemical entities,173orphan drugs,174
and pediatric studies.175
The 1997 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
(FDAMA)established an additional six-month exclusivity period for
studies done on children.176 The purpose of the pediatric exclusivity
was to improve pediatric labeling of drugs to correct a lackof ade-
quate dosing,safety,and efficacy data because children are tradi-
tionally excluded from the drug development process.177FDAMA was
re-authorized in 2002and is one of the most successful federal ini-
tiatives for childrens health.178Whereas only eleven pediatric studies
were conducted in the sixyears before the FDAMA was enacted,191
were proposed in the first three years after the Act went into effect.179
Although the pediatric patent extension is a good model to apply
to the problem of incentivizing pharmaceutical companies to create
gender parity in drug development,the FDAMA process is voluntary
on both sides.180Additionally,a mere six-month extension for poten-
tially more expensive changes affecting every level of the drug devel-
opment process from cell lines through Phase III human clinical trials
may be too little to compensate drug developers for their effort.181 A
170.An NDA requests approval to market a drug.Review typically takes approximately
fifteen months.Id.
171.35U.S.C.§156(c)(2006).
172.THOMAS,supra note 164,at 17.
173.Id. at 348.
174.Orphan drugs are drugs that treat rare diseases and are thus very expensive.To
qualify for orphan drug status a drug must treat a rare disease which affects fewer than
200,000people in the United States or affects more than 200,000persons living in the
United States but for which there is no reasonable expectation that sales would recover
the costs of development.An orphan drug is exclusive for seven years.Orphan Drug Act,
Pub.L.No.97-414,96Stat.2049(1982)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
and 42U.S.C.);see Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions,FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditions
/ucm2005525.htm [http://perma.cc/PU4R-YA66].
175.THOMAS,supra note 164,at 369.
176.Id. at 37071; see also 21U.S.C.§355a (2004).
177.Leslie Kushner,Note,Incentivizing Postmarketing PharmaceuticalProduct Safety
Testing with Extension of Exclusivity Periods,19FORDHAM INTELL.PROP.MEDIA & ENT.
L.J.519,546(2009).
178.See THOMAS,supra note 164, at 37071.
179.PamelaPolitis,Transition from the Carrot to the Stick:The Evolutionof Pharmaceu-
ticalRegulations Concerning Pediatric Drug Testing,12WIDENERL.REV.271,282(2005).
180.See 21U.S.C.§355a(b)(1).
181.For more information on the pros and cons of patent extension as an incentive for
drug development behavior see Hathaway,supra note 25,at 171.
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patent extension has the advantage of incentivizing desired pharma-
ceutical company behavior but it does not address any riskadverse-
ness in the women needed to sign up for clinical trials.182 Thus,a
patent extension may need to be paired with some carrot for indi-
vidual women signing up for these potentially risky procedures.
B. Prescription Drug User Fee Act Filings
Pharmaceutical companies are required to file applications to
the FDA accompanied by fees.183 One possible incentive to induce
pharmaceutical companies to include more women in all stages of the
drug development process is to reduce the required filing fees, or
to jump a drug to the front of the development line, thus allowing
them to expediently recoup their investment by achieving faster FDA
approval and market penetration.
The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA)184 authorizes
[the]FDA to collect fees from companies that produce certain human
drug and biological products.185 PDUFA establishes three tiers of
fees:application fees,establishment fees,and product fees.186PDUFA
was established against the 1990s backlog in the drug approval pro-
cess,which delayed the launch of many drugs to the market.187 The
backlog led to drug lag, where drugs were being approved by for-
eign health agencies before they were approved for United States
patients.188 PDUFA was enacted to make the drug approval process
more effective and timely,increase the FDA budget with income from
user fees,and hold the FDA accountable for meeting performance
objectives in the drug approval time line.189
182.See id. at 172.
183.Frequently Asked Questions on Prescription Drug User Fees (PDUFA),FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN.,http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusiness
Assistance/ucm069943.htm [http://perma.cc/DUH2-86X7].
184.Id.
185.Id.
186.Under PDUFA,a 505(b)(1)application contains a full report of safety and effective-
ness.A 505(b)(2)application is one where the investigations were conducted by another
party.A supplement may also be submitted to request to the Secretary to approve a
change in a human drug application which has been approved.Id. Application fees are
one-time fees for New Drug Applications (NDA)and Biologics License Application (BLA).
Establishment fees are an annual fee for manufacturers.Product fees are an annual fee
for products on the market.PDUFA and MDUFA History,CAL.HEALTHCARE INST.,http://
www.chi.org/uploadedFiles/Legislative_Action/Federal_Issues/PDUFA-MDUFA-History
.pdf [http://perma.cc/NCX6-KXF2].
187.PDUFA and MDUFA History,supra note 186.
188.Id.
189.Id.
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Together, the three types of fees application, establishment,
and product provide one-third of total FDA fee revenues for a fiscal
year.190 The total amount of PDUFA revenue that the FDA collects
in user fees is independent of the number of waivers or reductions
in fees that are granted.191
Target revenues are established in accordance with a statutory
formula,and the amount of each type of fee (application,product,
and establishment)is determined based on historical data of how
many applications,products,and establishments were assessed
fees in the previous fiscal year.Therefore,the more waivers or
reductions are granted,the more fees must be increased the fol-
lowing year forapplications,products,and establishments subject
to fees to meet the annual statutory revenue targets.192
Because of the structure of PDUFA fees,a solution whereby individ-
ual pharmaceutical companies are granted fee exceptions or have
their products jumped to the front of the line may be unworkable.
PDUFA fees fund the FDA to have a sufficient number of medical
reviewers to process new drug applications.193 Since the entire pur-
pose of PDUFA was to expedite safe,new drug patents,decreasing
the capacity of the FDA by underfunding the system to review
drugs may be counterproductive.
CONCLUSION
It goes without saying that modern medicine has revolutionized
the course of a human life in the 21st century.However,a course cor-
rection is needed when half of the population is left by the wayside
to cope with medicine that has not been analyzed for sex-related re-
sponse differences.Although great strides have been made since the
days of thalidomide, gender differentials need to be accounted for
from cell line through Phase III clinical trials for women to have
parity in diagnosis,treatment,and efficacy.
To solve this problem,it is important to take into account the
riskpreferences of the women needed to enroll in potentially risky
early drug trials.Previously suggested litigation-based solutions lack
190.Id.
191.Guidance for Industry User Fee Waivers, Reductions, and Refunds for Drug and
Biological Products,FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.2(Sept.2011),http://www.fda.gov/downloads
/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm079298.pdf [http://
perma.cc/WJ56-862W].
192.Id.
193.PDUFA and MDUFA History,supra note 186.
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standing in current law.However,incentivizing pharmaceutical com-
panies to put their not-inconsiderable resources into changing the
riskpreferences of women with marketing efforts and cash payouts is
a way to leverage their power and size to the governments advantage.
A qui tam statute empowering specialized organizations,and
closely monitored by the FDA to avoid settlement problems,could be
the stick to encourage pharmaceutical companies to fulfill FDA-
mandated guidelines for gender equality in development.A patent
extension on new molecular entities that fulfill those same guide-
lines could be the carrot creating monetary incentives and reserves
for the pharmaceutical companies.That money could cover market-
ing and cash payouts to encourage women to enroll.This two-pronged
solution would both incentivize pharmaceutical companies and take
into account the riskpreference of the women needed to enroll.Laws
that workto play on the incentives of all the parties involved have the
best chance at harnessing the power of the pharmaceutical market to
achieve gender parity in drug development.
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